Bankruptcy Phobia by Skeel, David A., Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
Summer 2009 
Bankruptcy Phobia 
David A. Skeel Jr. 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, 
Finance and Financial Management Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal History Commons, 
and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Skeel, David A. Jr., "Bankruptcy Phobia" (2009). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 300. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/300 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
  
 
333 
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 
© 2009 TEMPLE UNIVERSITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF               
HIGHER EDUCATION 
VOL. 82 NO. 2 SUMMER 2009 
ARTICLES 
BANKRUPTCY PHOBIA 
David A. Skeel, Jr.∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My title might seem to herald an extended discussion about the reluctance of 
Americans who are deeply in debt to file for bankruptcy. The question of whether 
the stigma of bankruptcy curbs the number of bankruptcy filings has indeed been 
the subject of a long, hotly contested debate. On the one hand, interviews wi th 
debtors suggest that most file for bankruptcy only reluctantly and as a last resort.1 
A surprising number of Americans believe that the 2005 amendments to the 
bankruptcy laws abolished bankruptcy, and thus that they could not file for 
bankruptcy even if they wanted to.2 On the other hand, enormous numbers of 
Americans have made use of bankruptcy, both in the past generation and in the past 
year. After averaging over 1,000,000 a year starting in the mid-1990s, bankruptcy 
filings dropped precipitously after the 2005 amendments, to 618,000 in 2006.3 But 
 
∗ S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School and 
Research Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute. This Essay is a revised version of the 
keynote address for the Temple Law Review’s symposium on “Bankruptcy in 2009: Practical 
Challenges, Scholarly Responses.”   I have sought to preserve the tone and content of the talk. 
1. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 32–33 
(2000) (surveying debtors and finding nearly fifty who reported that bankruptcy filing was last resort 
only after alternatives failed). 
2. See Cathy Moran, Bankruptcy Survives, On the Bankruptcy Soapbox, http://www.moranlaw.net 
/blog/bankruptcy-survives (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) (noting that “some large portion of the public” 
thinks that bankruptcy relief is no longer available). See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy laws. 
3. Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980–2008), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&C
ONTENTID=56822 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). 
  
334 TEMPLE LA W REVIE W [Vol. 82 
 
they have been climbing ever since, to 851,000 in 2007, and back to over 
1,000,000 once again last year.4  
I do think there are links between the stigma debate and the bankruptcy 
phobia I have in mind. As with stigma, perceptions of bankruptcy and their effect 
on the use or avoidance of bankruptcy will figure prominently in the discussion 
that follows. But the focus of this Essay will be a little different. Rather than asking 
whether ordinary Americans have an aversion to filing for bankruptcy, the 
discussion that follows will consider the puzzling—and, I will argue, costly—
aversion of regulators and lawmakers to bankruptcy: the bankruptcy phobia as it 
played out in Washington and as regulators descended on troubled investment 
banks in New York and struggling automakers in Detroit. 
As the recent economic crisis has unfolded, bankruptcy has offered possible 
solutions at several key junctures. The first of these solutions was geared toward 
homeowners who faced the loss of their homes in the months—now several years—
since the start of the subprime crisis.5 As several million consumers have defaulted 
or faced default on their mortgages over the last year or so, lawmakers have debated 
a reform that would allow homeowners to restructure their mortgages in 
bankruptcy. Under current law, a bankruptcy debtor cannot reduce the principal 
balance of a mortgage on her primary residence.6 If she owes $1,000 on her 
mortgage, for instance, but the value of the house has dropped to $700, she must 
pay the full $1,000 in order to keep her house. First offered in similar versions by 
Senator Durbin and Representative Conyers, and variously referred to as 
“cramdown,” “stripdown,” or “mortgage modification,” the proposed reform 
would allow the homeowner to restructure the mortgage, reducing it to $700, thus 
giving it the same treatment as most other assets in bankruptcy.7 At least in theory, 
this might both help many homeowners keep their homes and contribute to price 
discovery in the real estate markets.8 While lawmakers and the Obama 
 
4. The exact numbers are 617,660 in 2006, 850,912 in 2007, and 1,117,771 in 2008. Id. 
Bankruptcy filings exceeded 1,000,000 for the first time in 1996, continued climbing, and then leveled 
off at roughly 1,500,000 a year before the 2005 amendments. Id.  
5. The subprime crisis does not have an agreed-upon starting date, but one candidate is the failure 
of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in the summer of 2007. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in 
the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 734 (2008) (book review) (suggesting that failure of two hedge 
funds will be identified as beginning of recent subprime crisis). 
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) currently precludes debtors who propose a payment plan under Chapter 
13 from altering the terms of a mortgage on their principal residence. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).  
7. See Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, H.R. 200, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (delineating bill sponsored by Representative Conyers that Congress is currently considering); 
Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin Introduces Bill to Stem Record Foreclosures (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseId=306368 (providing brief overview of Durbin’s 
efforts). 
8. By “price discovery,” I mean determination of the value of mortgaged properties and of the 
complex financial instruments based upon them. Many commentators believe that uncertainty about the 
value of mortgage-backed securities was one of the major contributing factors in the credit crunch. See, 
e.g., Michael Steinberg, Mortgage “Cram Downs” Quickest Route to CDO, MBS Price Discovery, 
SEEKING ALPHA, Feb. 1, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/117805 – mortgage – cram – downs – 
quickest – route – to – cdo – mbs – price - discovery (emphasizing need for price discovery in order to 
unclog movement of toxic assets). 
  
2009] BANKRUPTCY PHOBIA 335 
 
administration have adopted a variety of other proposals that are designed to help 
homeowners, Congress has repeatedly stymied the mortgage modification 
solution.9 
On the corporate side, Chapter 11 was an obvious alternative when large 
nonbank financial institutions like Bear Stearns and AIG stumbled in 2008, and 
with General Motors and Chrysler as well. But regulators consistently shied away 
from bankruptcy. The first exception, Lehman Brothers, was an anomaly. By bailing 
out Bear Stearns in early 2008, the government had strongly signaled its intent to 
rescue large, troubled financial institutions. Against this backdrop, the decision 
by then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and others to withhold financing from 
Lehman took Lehman, its buyer, and the markets by surprise.10 Similarly, the 
Treasury put the car companies in bankruptcy only after they received roughly 
$13.4 billion in bailout money and other options had proven fruitless.11 “[A] GM 
or Chrysler bankruptcy ‘would be the start of a cascade of failures,’” a typical 
article concluded during the months when the car companies refused to even 
consider the possibility of a bankruptcy filing.12  
Bankruptcy has been resisted for often inconsistent reasons. The principal 
opponents of the mortgage modification proposal are conservatives, who decry it 
as an unconscionable interference with markets and the sanctity of contract. “We 
look at this bill as a bailout. But worse than that, it is interfering with contracts,” a 
spokesman for the Bush administration stated when the mortgage modification 
proposal was announced.13 Critics of using bankruptcy to resolve the financial 
distress of nonbank financial institutions and the carmakers, on the other hand, 
 
9. The Bush and Obama administrations’ mortgage relief efforts as of March 2009 are summarized in 
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION 30–37 
(2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-report.pdf. The early results of the 
programs were disappointing. See Ruth Simon, Mortgage Servicers Are Under Pressure to Modify More 
Loans, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2009, at A6 (stating that administration officials are “[f]rustrated with the 
slow progress”). As of this writing, more loans are being modified, but the efficacy of the modifications 
is still in doubt. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 3–5 (2009), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf (discussing Panel’s concerns with current 
modification programs and offering suggestions for improvement).  
10 . This argument is made in detail in Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or 
Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362639. 
11 . See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Bush Announces Auto Rescue, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 19, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/19/news/companies/auto_crisis/index.htm (outlining details and purpose 
of auto rescue plan).  
12 . Michael McKee, GM, Chrysler Failure Would Push Economy into Abyss, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aW2D17IBa2Kk&refer=home (quoting 
Dennis Virag, president of Automotive Consulting Group in Ann Arbor, Michigan).  
13 . David Cho & Lyndsey Layton, Housing Woes Put Bush, Hill at Odds: White House Opposes 
Use of Tax Dollars, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2008, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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often have included liberals who complain that bankruptcy means leaving too 
much to the markets, and that it is a dangerously market-oriented response.14  
This shared aversion to bankruptcy, which seems to pervade all sides of the 
political spectrum, is the bankruptcy phobia that I would like to explore in this 
Essay. I will begin by speculating in more detail about the reasons for resisting 
bankruptcy-based solutions. Although this initial analysis will be descriptive, my 
own view that the aversion to bankruptcy was quite costly, and that it steered 
regulators and lawmakers away from promising responses to the economic crisis, 
will seep through. The third and fourth parts of the Essay will then put the recent 
crisis in historical perspective. While the absence of bankruptcy solutions and 
new bankruptcy reforms at the outset of the crisis was puzzling, the historical 
analysis suggests that it is consistent with the pattern of previous crises. Using 
the late nineteenth century and the Great Depression as my principal examples, I 
will argue that significant bankruptcy reform, in striking contrast to major 
corporate reform, has often come well after a financial crisis was underway, and that 
the proliferation of dramatically different proposed bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy 
solutions that we see today is also consistent with historical patterns. I will 
conclude by speculating about some of the implications for bankruptcy reform. 
Although the government’s use of bankruptcy for Chrysler and GM could mitigate 
the bankruptcy phobia, its circumvention of ordinary bankruptcy processes makes 
this unlikely. The prospects for legislative reform—particularly the undoing of 
several costly 2005 changes—are more promising.  
II. WHY THE AVERSION TO BANKRUPTCY? 
Start with the question that lies at the heart of this Essay: why were 
regulators and lawmakers so reluctant to use bankruptcy during the current crisis ? 
One can point to at least four contributing factors. 
First, we cannot rule out the possibility—call it the public-spirited 
explanation—that bankruptcy is flawed or simply a bad idea as a response to the 
mortgage crisis, or for resolving financial institutions’ distress. This first 
explanation is sufficiently plausible that we will want to consider it in some detail. 
Critics of the mortgage modification proposal argue that the proposal would 
exacerbate the credit crunch. In response to the reduction in homeowners’ payment 
obligations, the reasoning goes, and the prospect that future mortgages could also 
be modified in bankruptcy, lenders would tighten their already tight lending 
standards. Would-be home buyers would face higher interest rates or would simply 
be denied access to credit. The cost of mortgage modification would be “borne by 
aspiring future homeowners,” according to one commentator, and “[t]he ripple 
 
14 . See generally Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The B Word, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at A19 
(defending Bear Stearns bailout, despite Bear’s unsavory reputation, as necessary to prevent potentially 
catastrophic market effects). The Obama administration’s proposed resolution authority for systemically 
important institutions is based on a similar distrust of bankruptcy. See infra notes 92–96 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the administration’s reform plan.  
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effects could further roil America’s consumer credit markets.”15 Given the large 
number of homeowners whose mortgages are under water, critics also speculate that 
the bankruptcy system would be overwhelmed by a flood of new bankruptcy 
filings if Congress enacted the proposal.16 
Proponents of mortgage modification responded to the concerns about 
deleterious effects on access to credit by limiting the scope of the proposal.17 The 
revised proposal would apply only to existing mortgages and would require 
homeowners to negotiate for a voluntary restructuring before using bankruptcy to 
modify a mortgage.18 The proposal would help write off the current crisis, but the 
rules would then revert to normal, with mortgages once again being treated as 
sacrosanct in bankruptcy. Although this adjustment assuaged a few critics, most 
predicted dire consequences even under the revised proposal.19  
As to financial institutions and auto companies—the objects of corporate 
bankruptcy phobia—critics have argued that a bankruptcy filing would have 
catastrophic spillover effects. Regulators justified each of the major financial 
institution bailouts at the time, as did commentators after the fact, as necessary to 
prevent a market meltdown. If Bear Stearns had not been bailed out, the reasoning 
went, repo lending—a major form of very short-term lending for investment 
banks—or the credit default swap market might have been paralyzed.20 Because 
AIG had sold large amounts of credit protection, its failure would have crippled 
the market for credit default swaps, and its inability to make good on its 
contractual promises would have precipitated a wave of bankruptcies among its 
counterparties—that is, the institutions with which AIG entered into derivatives 
contracts.21 The one exception to the string of financial institution bailouts was 
Lehman, whose bankruptcy sent shock waves through the commercial paper market 
 
15 . Todd J. Zywicki, Don’t Let Judges Tear Up Mortgage Contracts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 
2009, at A13. 
16 . See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Fix Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at 
A27 (detailing problems that could arise in bankruptcy courts if Congress passed mortgage modification 
proposal); Zywicki, supra note 15 (predicting likely increase in bankruptcy filings as result of mortgage 
modification proposal).  
17 . See, e.g., U.S. Senate Rejects Mortgage Modification in Chapter 13 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., June 2009, at 10, 10 [hereinafter U.S. Senate Rejects] (excerpting statements of Senators Durbin and 
Kyl, including Durbin’s emphasis that modification, while broad enough to help debtors, also contains 
limitations that protect mortgage servicers). 
18 . See, e.g., id. (emphasizing plan for amendment to assist troubled homeowners whose last resort 
is bankruptcy); Robert M. Zinman & Novica Petrovski, The Home Mortgage and Chapter 13: An Essay 
on Unintended Consequences, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 142–43 (2009) (noting that House 
bill introduced by Congressman Conyers includes each of these restrictions); John Conyers Jr., Loan 
Modification Can Stop the Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2009, at A11 (explaining narrow 
application of proposal only to existing mortgages). 
19 . See, e.g., U.S. Senate Rejects, supra note 17, at 69 (presenting Senator Kyl’s statement that 
cramdown will prolong malaise of housing market by increasing interest rates). 
20 . See Gretchen Morgenson, Fair Game: A Window in a Smoky Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2008, at BU1 (suggesting that concerns about credit default swaps were key factor in bailout).  
21 . See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 977–83 (2009).  
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and caused a money market fund to “break the buck” for the first time ever.22 
Lehman’s bankruptcy is regularly—and in my view mistakenly—described as 
having triggered the worst effects of the recent crisis.23 
Far more than financial institutions, troubled car companies would seem to be 
ideal candidates for Chapter 11. Like the nineteenth-century railroads whose 
turmoil was the crucible in which American reorganization was created, car 
companies have large amounts of fixed assets and complicated capital structures.24 
Yet here too, regulators and commentators treated bankruptcy as radioactive while 
GM’s and Chrysler’s troubles mounted. Critics worried that no one would buy a 
company’s cars if it filed for bankruptcy, in part due to a fear that the company 
would disappear and fail to honor its warranty obligations. They also predicted 
that a bankruptcy filing could have devastating spillover effects, prompting 
bankruptcies of the company’s major suppliers. Former GM CEO Rick Wagoner 
pointed to each of these concerns, especially the claim that the “stigma” of 
bankruptcy would discourage customers from buying GM cars, as reasons for 
refusing to consider bankruptcy as an option.25 
The objections to bankruptcy for GM and Chrysler were never plausible. The 
track record of other industries, from the railroads of the nineteenth century to the 
airlines more recently, suggests that customers will not abandon a viable business 
simply because Chapter 11 is attached to its name.26 But the public-spirited 
critiques of bankruptcy responses to the mortgage crisis and the distress of 
nonbank financial institutions were more realistic. For instance, a group of 
coauthors from Columbia’s law and business schools proposed an interesting 
alternative to the mortgage modification proposal, which would remove the 
impediments to restructuring mortgages that have been securitized and would give 
servicers a financial incentive to restructure mortgages where this would enable 
homeowners to continue making payments.27 While the existing empirical evidence 
is mixed, it does not rule out the possibility that mortgage modification would 
 
22 . A mutual fund “breaks the buck” when a customer who withdraws her money will receive less 
than a dollar for each dollar she invested. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra  note 10 (manuscript at 24–
25) (detailing Lehman bankruptcy and subsequent effects). 
23 . See id. (manuscript at 21–25) (arguing that information that major bank was tottering, not 
bankruptcy filing, best explains market reaction). 
24 . The complex capital structures of the nineteenth-century railroads, and their role in the advent 
of corporate reorganization, are discussed in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 60–63 (2001). 
25 . See Justin Fox, Don’t Call It Bankruptcy, TIME, Dec. 1, 2008, at 32, 32 (describing 
Wagoner’s objections to bankruptcy). 
26 . See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Why Bankruptcy Is the Best Option for GM, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
17, 2008, at A19 (noting that “consumers buy tickets from bankrupt airlines” and rejecting argument 
that carmakers are different in this regard).  
27 . See Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for Loan 
Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 419–20 (2009) (proposing three-part plan of servicer 
incentives, second-lien lender incentives, and litigation protection). The Obama administration adopted 
somewhat analogous strategies in the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan. Announced on 
February 18, 2009, the plan provides financial incentives for mortgage servicers to modify troubled 
mortgages. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 9, at 3–4 (providing overview of plan). 
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make mortgages more costly.28 The concerns about the effect of allowing a large 
financial institution to file for bankruptcy also are plausible; it is at least possible 
that a bankruptcy filing by a large financial institution would unleash systemic 
risk, with destructive market-wide consequences, as regulators feared when they 
intervened to rescue Bear Stearns and AIG.29 
But each of these public-spirited arguments also is subject to significant 
question. Even if mortgage modification did increase the cost of mortgages, the cost 
might well be small and worth bearing.30 Mortgage modification could help 
establish credible values for the mortgages—and more importantly, for the 
mortgage-related financial assets associated with them—thus addressing the 
valuation uncertainty that has significantly complicated efforts to move beyond the 
credit crisis.31 Although the reform would spur a surge of new bankruptcy filings, 
there is little reason to believe that this would overwhelm the bankruptcy courts. 
Bankruptcy judges have stepped up to handle surges of new cases in the past—
most recently, when a wave of debtors filed for bankruptcy before the most recent 
bankruptcy amendments went into effect in October 2005—and it seems likely they 
would do so again.32 While it is difficult to prove or disprove the systemic risk 
concerns that are used to justify the preference for bailouts rather than bankruptcies 
with financial institutions, these concerns seem overstated. Even in the case of 
AIG, which had a huge, imbalanced derivatives portfolio, counterparties may well 
have been able to adjust if the insurance conglomerate had filed for bankruptcy.33 
Moreover, if regulators are convinced that default could have dangerous ripple 
effects in the market, nothing prevents them from stepping in and providing 
financing or guarantees for a company that has filed for bankruptcy. Regulators can 
make loans to a debtor in bankruptcy, or promise to backstop counterparties that 
 
28 . Compare Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on 
Mortgage Markets 41 (Geo. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 1087816, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087816 (concluding that mortgage modification 
would have only modest effects on lending), and Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: 
Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 647 (same), with Mayer et al., supra  
note 27, at 427 (surveying existing studies, including study by Levitin and Goodman, and concluding 
that effect is substantial).  
29 . See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fears that prompted the 
Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts. 
30 . See, e.g., Levitin & Goodman, supra note 28, at 41 (concluding that markets are generally 
indifferent to mortgage modification risk).  
31 . See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding price 
discovery. 
32 . Bankruptcy filings exceeded two million in 2005, due to debtors’ rush to file before the 2005 
changes went into effect. In 2006, the first full year under the amendments, there were only 617,660 
bankruptcy filings. See Am. Bankr. Inst., supra note 3 (compiling data for annual business and 
nonbusiness bankruptcy filings by year from 1980 to 2008).  
33 . See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, On Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered “Too Big to 
Fail,” Testimony Before the Senate Banking Committee (May 6, 2009) (transcript), available at  
http://www.aei.org/speech/100044 (criticizing claim that AIG bankruptcy would have crippled 
derivatives markets).  
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could be hobbled by the debtor’s default. This, of course, is precisely what the 
Obama administration did when Chrysler and GM finally filed for bankruptcy.34  
The public-spirited explanations are thus credible but quite debatable. They 
do not fully explain the aversion to bankruptcy as the crisis developed. Several 
other factors also seem to have played a role. 
Shifting from platonic to more political realms, the most obvious impediment 
to bankruptcy-based solutions was lobbying by banks and other financial 
institutions. Given that banks had become dependent on government handouts for 
survival, one would expect their political influence to have been at low ebb. In 
some respects it was. The government successfully pressured Bank of America to 
follow through on its acquisition of Merrill Lynch even after major losses at 
Merrill gave Bank of America second thoughts about the transaction.35 Bank 
lenders that had received federal bailout money quickly succumbed to 
administration pressure prior to the Chrysler bankruptcy, for instance, and agreed 
to accept significant losses, even though the banks’ priority status seemed to 
entitle them to a greater recovery.36 
But lenders clearly remained a potent lobbying force. Until Citigroup broke 
ranks in the wake of a promise of additional bailout money from the government, 
the banking industry had presented a united front opposing the mortgage 
modification reform.37 Arguing that the reform would cripple future lending, 
financial institutions persuaded Congress to dilute the proposal and played a 
central role in defeating even the more limited proposal.38 
To resolve their own financial distress, banks and nonbank financial 
institutions pushed for bailouts, the principal alternative to resolving their 
failures in Chapter 11. AIG’s principal accomplishment as it neared collapse in the 
fall of 2008, for instance, was producing a memo documenting for regulators the 
chaos that allegedly would ensue if the government allowed AIG to file for 
 
34 . See Jeff Plungis, Chrysler Bankruptcy Won’t Interrupt Warranties, Treasury Says, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 2, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ai1YZ10u7BcE (explaining application of 
government warranty program to GM and Chrysler). 
35 . See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal: Bank of America Chief Says 
Bernanke, Paulson Barred Disclosure of Merrill Woes Because of Fears for Financial System, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009, at A1 (describing pressure to complete deal because “otherwise it would ‘impose a 
big risk to the financial system’”). 
36 . See Neil King Jr. & Jeffrey McCracken, Chrysler Pushed into Fiat’s Arms, WALL ST. J., May 1, 
2009, at A1 (“The most compliant of Chrysler’s big creditors . . . have received hundreds of billions of 
dollars in TARP aid.”). 
37 . See Theo Francis, Does Citigroup Stand Alone? Industry Balks at Bankruptcy Bill, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Jan. 8, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/election/2008/blog/archives/2009/01/does 
_citigroup.html?chan=top+news_top+news+index+-+temp_news+%2B+analysis (detailing industry’s 
opposition to mortgage modification legislation). 
38 . See U.S. Senate Rejects, supra note 17, at 10 (“The mortgage industry has twice succeeded in 
helping to kill the bankruptcy proposal . . . .”). 
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bankruptcy.39 When the government proposed to give banking regulators the 
authority to take control of systemically important bank financial institutions—a 
reform that would essentially expand the government’s bailout policy—financial 
institutions signaled their approval.40 
Intertwined with the political influence of financial institutions as 
institutions is a third factor: their executives and the executives of other companies 
affected by the economic crisis. One would expect executives to have had less clout 
than anyone during the economic crisis. They, after all, are widely viewed as the 
chief villains in the crisis, a status cemented by a bonus scandal at AIG.41 While 
their influence in the halls of Congress seems to have waned temporarily, the 
executives of each of the faltering firms were able to persuade regulators and the 
public that bankruptcy should not be taken seriously as a response to financial 
distress. Former GM CEO Rick Wagoner repeatedly insisted that bankruptcy was 
unthinkable—it would be “a highly risky and highly costly process,” he 
claimed—as the company burned through $2 billion in cash per month in the final 
quarter of 2008, and lost $20 billion for the year.42 As already noted, AIG’s 
executives produced a worst-case-scenario memo that struck a responsive chord 
with regulators.43  
Executives’ influence in these cases was essentially negative, but it 
nevertheless shaped the regulatory response. By refusing to take any steps to 
prepare for a bankruptcy, the managers of Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG, and General 
Motors maximized the disruption that would occur if bankruptcy became necessary 
and used this as leverage in their negotiations for a bailout.44 
The final factor is widespread misconceptions about bankruptcy. Many people 
still seem to think that bankruptcy means corporate death—the inevitable end of an 
enterprise—as it does in much of the world. Even I had to chuckle when I realized 
that a bankruptcy conference I attended during the height of the crisis was being 
held at the same time, and in the same hotel, as the national undertakers’ 
convention. But the reality is that for well over a century, bankruptcy has meant a 
 
39 . See Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Case for Saving A.I.G., by A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at 
B1 (outlining confidential memo’s concern that failure of AIG could spur catastrophic failure of insurance 
industry). 
40 . See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 33 (noting this support and expressing surprise that smaller 
institutions did not initially oppose proposed legislation, which would likely benefit the largest 
institutions by identifying them as too big to fail). 
41 . See, e.g., Andrew Clark, Congress Grills Geithner and Bernanke over AIG Bonus Scandal, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/24/bernanke-geithner-
aig-bonuses-testimony (discussing backlash resulting from distribution of bonuses). 
42 . Philip Nussel, Wagoner’s Words Underscore Industry Crisis, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Mar. 30, 
2009 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20090330/ANA02/903299981/1178/ ANA03. 
43 . See supra note 39 and accompanying text for additional information on the AIG executives’ 
memo. 
44 . Lehman, of course, did not succeed, and the government ultimately steered the carmakers into 
bankruptcy as well. Cf. Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in 
Value, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A10 (discussing some costs of Lehman’s failure to plan for 
possible bankruptcy filing). 
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fresh start for individual debtors, and corporate reorganization has often meant a 
second chance for large companies.45 According to a recent study, more than 
seventy percent of the companies that enter bankruptcy with a plausible prospect 
of reorganizing do in fact successfully restructure.46 Even when companies are sold 
rather than reorganized, bankruptcy is a very effective mechanism for dealing with 
their financial distress. 
The misconceptions about bankruptcy may have been magnified by the major 
amendments to the bankruptcy laws that Congress passed in 2005.47 The debate 
over the amendments and the amendments themselves cast bankruptcy—especially 
consumer bankruptcy—in a bad light. Proponents of the changes argued that 
bankruptcy filings impose a cost amounting to $400 for each American.48 As 
enacted, the reforms added substantial new obligations and potential liability for 
bankruptcy lawyers and curbed the discretion of bankruptcy judges, each of which 
suggested that something was amok with the bankruptcy system.49 As noted 
earlier, many Americans thought that the changes tolled the death knell for 
bankruptcy.50 
Ordinary Americans are not the only ones who seem to have had a limited or 
even mistaken understanding of bankruptcy. As the financial crisis unfolded, the 
principal decision makers were regulators whose experience was far removed from 
bankruptcy. The decisions to bail out Bear Stearns and AIG were made by then 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, then New York Federal Reserve Bank President 
Timothy Geithner, and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. None of the three 
has any evident bankruptcy expertise.51 Similarly, the Federal Reserve banks, 
which produced much of the research that informed regulators’ decision making, 
had numerous economists with a sophisticated understanding of the banking 
system but few with any familiarity with bankruptcy.52 This gap in expertise seems 
to have reinforced the inclination to dismiss bankruptcy as unthinkable.53 
 
45 . See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 24, at 1–2 (emphasizing uniqueness of American bankruptcy 
law).  
46 . Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the 
Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 618 (2009).  
47 . Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
48 . E.g., SKEEL, supra note 24, at 203. 
49 . See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 94 (describing hostility to 
bankruptcy lawyers and judges reflected in 2005 reforms). 
50 . See Moran, supra note 2 (discussing public fears after 2005 amendments). 
51 . Paulson came from Goldman Sachs, where he had risen to the chairmanship from Goldman’s 
investment banking group; Geithner cut his teeth in the international affairs division of the Treasury 
during the Clinton administration; and Bernanke, a scholar with expertise in monetary policy, was best 
known for studies concluding that monetary policy exacerbated the Great Depression. See, e.g., DAVID 
WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 10–12, 40–41, 73–75, 111–13 
(2009) (detailing backgrounds of leaders confronting crisis).  
52 . This comment is based on conversations with current and former Federal Reserve economists. 
53 . The carmaker bankruptcies were a notable exception to this pattern. The auto task force made 
extensive use of top bankruptcy professionals. See Emily Chasan, U.S. Autos Task Force Hires 
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The importance of this last factor should not be understated. If lawmakers and 
regulators had been more familiar and more comfortable with bankruptcy, the 
interest group obstacles might well have been overcome. Although financial 
institutions wield enormous clout, lawmakers could have coupled the billions of 
dollars of bailout money with an insistence that banks accept the mortgage 
modification proposal as part of a package deal. If Bear Stearns and AIG had been 
allowed to file for bankruptcy, perhaps with some government support for their 
trades, the crisis might have unfolded differently—and been dealt with more 
effectively.54 If regulators had prodded Chrysler and General Motors toward 
bankruptcy earlier, these carmakers might have saved billions of dollars and been 
in much better shape when they began their restructuring. 
III. HISTORY LESSON #1: REFORM OFTEN COMES LATE 
As frustrating as the absence of bankruptcy-related reforms has been for 
advocates of bankruptcy-based solutions, it is not surprising from a historical 
perspective. Although economic crises have often prompted bankruptcy reforms in 
the past, major legislative change often seems to come well after the onset of the 
crisis. To see this, it is useful to contrast bankruptcy reform with its near cousin, 
corporate and financial regulation. 
In the wake of major corporate or financial crises—particularly those that 
involve corporate scandals, as most do—Congress often springs into action 
immediately.55 The most familiar example is the Great Depression. By the time 
Franklin Roosevelt took office, the Depression had fully taken hold, and the 
election campaign itself had been punctuated by spectacular collapses such as the 
failure of Samuel Insull’s utilities empire.56 The Roosevelt administration 
responded immediately, passing major banking reforms and the first of two 
securities laws in its first hundred days.57 More recently, Congress’s response to 
the Enron and WorldCom scandals followed a similar pattern. Within weeks of the 
revelation that WorldCom had committed a multibillion-dollar fraud, Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms.58 
Unlike new corporate or financial regulation, the most important bankruptcy 
reforms seem to come well after the onset of a crisis. Lawmakers have often 
responded with immediate, temporary fixes, which are then followed by more 
 
Bankruptcy Lawyer, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE52C5V520090314 (discussing U.S. government’s 
consultation with bankruptcy lawyers at several large law firms in conjunction with GM and Chrysler 
restructuring).  
54 . See David Skeel, Give Bankruptcy a Chance, WKLY. STANDARD, June 29, 2009, at 25–27 
(discussing these points in greater detail). 
55 . The relationship between corporate scandals and regulatory reform is a major theme of DAVID 
SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY 
CAME FROM (2005), and David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 
155 (2005). 
56 . See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 55, at 80–89 (analyzing Insull failure). 
57 . See id. at 94–103 (detailing government’s regulatory response). 
58 . Id. at 175–77. 
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thoroughgoing reforms later in the cycle. Two historical examples will illustrate 
the pattern. 
The first is the federal bankruptcy laws of the nineteenth century. When an 
economic crisis—or “panic,” as they were called—hit, state lawmakers quickly 
passed stay laws that prevented or delayed efforts of creditors to foreclose on the 
property of farmers and small businessmen. As Charles Warren pointed out in his 
1935 history of bankruptcy: 
 While these [stay] laws were in most instances held invalid by the 
State Courts (and eventually by the United States Supreme Court), they 
largely achieved their purpose of giving temporary protection to the 
debtor and conservation of his property from forced sales, during the 
interval between enactment of the law and its invalidation by the 
Court.59 
Thus, the first move during a crisis was usually to pass laws that provided for 
temporary relief. Later in the crisis, sometimes much later, Congress would finally 
pass bankruptcy legislation that effectively wrote off the effects of the crisis. This 
was the case with the short-lived bankruptcy laws passed in 1800, 1841, and 
1867, and with the permanent federal legislation finally passed in 1898.60 
The second illustration is once again the New Deal. Both Congress and the 
states passed legislation designed to facilitate restructuring early in the New Deal, 
but the early legislation was much more like the nineteenth-century stay laws than 
true bankruptcy reform. As they had in the nineteenth century, the states responded 
to the crisis by enacting stay laws, which the Supreme Court initially struck down 
but subsequently upheld.61 The federal response had three components. First, 
Congress enacted several measures that were designed to address farm mortgage 
distress.62 These measures, which were largely ineffectual, amounted to federal stay 
laws.63 Second, in 1933 and 1934 Congress codified corporate reorganization for 
the first time.64 The main purpose of the legislation was to make corporate 
reorganization—or equity receivership, as it was called then—a little less costly 
by establishing voting rules that would enable a majority of bondholders or other 
creditors to bind the class as a whole, thus removing the holdup power dissenters 
enjoyed in the absence of a binding vote.65 In most other respects, the legislation 
 
59 . CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 150 (1935). 
60 . See SKEEL, supra note 24, at 24–28 (discussing pattern of enactment and prompt repeal of 
various pieces of legislation). 
61 . The Supreme Court struck down the stay laws in 1933 and then finally upheld them a year 
later. (The Supreme Court voted against them before it voted for them, one might say). See Home Bldg. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934) (upholding Minnesota stay law that extended 
temporary relief to homeowners in certain mortgage foreclosures). 
62 . See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1141-48 (2009) 
(describing Frazier-Lemke Act and enactment of section 75 of Bankruptcy Act).  
63 . Id. 
64 . See SKEEL, supra note 24, at 101–09 (discussing these reforms, which added section 77 to 
Bankruptcy Act for railroad reorganization in 1933 and section 77B for other corporations the following 
year). 
65 . Id. at 106–07. 
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simply put a congressional seal of approval on the procedures that the parties had 
been using for decades.66  
A third stopgap measure implemented by Congress was 1933 legislation 
abrogating the so-called “gold clause” in corporate bonds. This clause gave 
bondholders the right to be paid in gold, or to a higher payout in dollars if the 
price of gold rose.67 By abrogating the clause, the Roosevelt administration made it 
much easier for corporate debtors to repay their bond debt, effectively reducing the 
repayment obligation by a whopping sixty-nine percent.68 Each of these measures 
was important, but they were tourniquets—immediate measures to stop the 
bleeding rather than substantial and permanent reforms. The major reforms did not 
come until 1938, when Congress completely overhauled the bankruptcy laws 
under the Chandler Act, which we will consider in the next section.69 
Why do we often see such a significant time lag between the onset of a 
financial crisis and the enactment of bankruptcy reform? One reason for the 
difference may be that, while corporate and financial crises are usually evidence of a 
breakdown of the existing corporate regulation, they do not necessarily reflect 
problems with the bankruptcy laws.70 It is important not to overstate this point. As 
we have seen, lawmakers do often respond to a crisis with insolvency-related 
legislation. But the more lasting reforms seem to come later in the cycle of crisis and 
recovery. 
IV.  HISTORY LESSON #2: THE NATURE OF REFORM IS NOT PREORDAINED 
If one lesson from history is that lasting bankruptcy reform often lags the 
crisis that spawned it, the second is that the direction of reform is not 
preordained.71 Looking back at the response to a crisis with the benefit of twenty-
twenty hindsight, we sometimes assume that whatever regulatory response 
eventuates was inevitable. But this, of course, is not the case at all. There often are a 
variety of possible responses, ranging from doing nothing at all to completely 
transforming American bankruptcy law. Which option is selected depends on 
numerous factors, not least of which are the strategic decisions and political savvy 
of the particular men and women who are promoting them. The two illustrations we 
considered earlier—the nineteenth-century bankruptcy laws and the enactment of 
the Chandler Act in 1938—are once again instructive. 
 
66 . Id. 
67 . The gold clause is described in Randall S. Kroszner, Is It Better to Forgive than to Receive? 
Repudiation of the Gold Indexation Clause in Long-Term Debt During the Great Depression 4 (Oct. 
1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/finance/papers/repudiation11.pdf. 
68 . This is because the value of gold climbed from $20.47 at the time of the abrogation during 
Roosevelt’s first one hundred days to $35 the following year. Id. at 1. 
69 . See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the passage of the Chandler 
Act. 
70 . Cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 
11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (2003) (noting absence of pressure for bankruptcy reform after 
Enron and WorldCom scandals of early 2000s). 
71 . In this second respect, bankruptcy reform is much more similar to corporate reform. 
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The legislation that became the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was hardly the only 
option on the table at the end of the nineteenth century. The debates that finally led 
to the 1898 Act began in 1881 and lasted almost twenty years.72 In the 1880s, 
there was significant support for a so-called Equity Bill, which was really a 
glorified stay law.73 Under the Equity Bill, existing state laws that provided for the 
marshalling of a debtor’s assets on behalf of its creditors would be implemented in 
federal court.74 During this same period, creditors rallied around the Lowell Bill, 
which Massachusetts District Court Judge John Lowell had drafted at the 
instigation of chambers of commerce and other creditors’ groups.75 The Lowell Bill, 
which provided for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy and for the 
avoidance of preferential prebankruptcy transfers, was subsequently replaced by 
the Torrey Bill, which would serve as the template for the law that was finally 
enacted in 1898.76 
The Torrey Bill might never have prevailed had it not been for Jay Torrey 
himself. Torrey—a colorful figure whose resume included participation in the 
Rough Riders campaign in Cuba—was a passionate lobbyist for the bill,77 but he 
also was willing to compromise. Even William Jennings Bryan, who thought 
federal bankruptcy legislation a terrible idea, commented at one point, “I have 
never known of any person interested in the passage of a bill through this House 
who seems to be so fair in the presentation of a case.”78 The compromises Torrey and 
his allies made were responsible both for the success of his bill and for what I think 
of as the genius of the 1898 Act.79  
Although the formula for success was somewhat different in the 1930s,80 the 
overall pattern was quite similar. The key figure in the 1930s was William O. 
Douglas. Douglas was a law professor at Columbia and then Yale; later, chair of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission; and then a Supreme Court justice for 
over thirty years.81 
 
72 . See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 24, at 33. 
73 . For a brief description, see WARREN, supra note 59, at 128. 
74 . Id. 
75 . See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 24, at 36–37. 
76 . For a discussion of the Lowell and Torrey Bills, see, for example, SKEEL, supra note 24, at 
40–43, and Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy 
Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 354–61 (1999).  
77 . SKEEL, supra note 24, at 37. 
78 . 25 CONG. REC. 2815 (1894) (statement of William Jennings Bryan).  
79 . See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 
321 (1999) (describing compromises such as incorporation of state exemption laws, minimal 
administrative structure, and limits on creditors’ ability to file involuntary petitions). 
80 . Compromise across party lines was much less essential in the late 1930s because the Democrats 
had a huge numerical majority. In 1938, they held seventy-six Senate seats, as opposed to sixteen 
Republicans (as well as one Progressive, two Farmer-Labor, and one Independent). U.S. Senate, Party 
Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 
2009). 
81 . See SKEEL, supra note 24, at 101–04, 109–27 (discussing Douglas’s background and his 
role in New Deal bankruptcy reforms). 
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Douglas was extremely hostile to Wall Street investment banks and 
lawyers—as personified by the Cravath law firm and leading banks J.P. Morgan 
and Kuhn, Loeb—and he wanted to radically reform large-scale corporate 
reorganization to reduce their role.82 As the overseer of a major corporate 
reorganization study authorized by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,83 and 
then as SEC chair and a regular participant in Franklin Roosevelt’s weekly poker 
games, Douglas was in a great position to effectuate his vision.84 But success was 
hardly guaranteed. There was substantial resistance to Douglas’s vision—which 
called for managers to be kicked out when a large corporation filed for bankruptcy 
and would disqualify the debtor’s prebankruptcy bankers and lawyers (read: J.P. 
Morgan and the Cravath firm) from participating in the reorganization.85 
Congressman Adolph Sabath had proposed an alternative bill that would provide 
for conservatorships of large insolvent corporations, and there were at least two 
other bills as well.86 Douglas’s correspondence with Abe Fortas—his protégé and 
also an eventual Supreme Court justice—shows just how worried they were about 
being preempted by the Sabath Bill. “I believe the situation is so serious,” Fortas 
wrote to Douglas, “that these contingencies [the possibility that the Sabath 
committee proposal would preempt Douglas’s proposal] are actually and extremely 
possible.”87  
Despite his ties to the administration and overwhelming Democratic control 
in the late 1930s, Douglas’s legislative track record was mixed. His efforts to 
promote a federal incorporation statute ran into a solid wall of bipartisan 
resistance.88 But Douglas and his allies cleverly, and in the end successfully, 
navigated the bankruptcy debates. In addition to stymieing the Sabath Bill 
internally, Douglas had his large-scale reorganization reforms attached as a 
separate chapter to a more technical bill that had been proposed by Congressman 
 
82 . Id. at 110–13. 
83 . The report was published in multiple volumes as SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY 
AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND 
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937–1940).  
84 . Douglas recounted his relationship with Roosevelt in his autobiography. See generally 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN passim (1st ed. 1974); cf. Jeffrey Rosen, The Justice Who 
Came to Dinner, N.Y. TIMES., Feb. 1, 2004, § 4, at 1, 3 (describing social relationship between Douglas 
and Roosevelt).  
85 . See SKEEL, supra note 24, at 118 (describing resistance and Douglas’s refusal to soften 
mandatory trustee provision). 
86 . In addition to the Chandler Bill, the principal proposals were the Sabath Bill and the Lea Bill. 
See, e.g., John Gerdes, Section 77B, The Chandler Bill and Other Proposed Revisions, 35 MICH. L. 
REV. 361, 368–409 (1937) (describing Sabath and Chandler Bills, and noting that other bills were 
expected); Cloyd Laporte, Note, Changes in Corporate Reorganization Procedure Proposed by the 
Chandler and Lea Bills, 51 HARV. L. REV. 672, 673–89 (1938) (describing proposals of Chandler and 
Lea Bills).  
87 . Memorandum from Abe Fortas to William O. Douglas 3 (Oct. 7, 1935) (from William O. 
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, copy on file with author). 
88 . The story is recounted in JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 205–11 (rev. ed. 
1995).  
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Chandler and which focused mostly on small-business bankruptcy.89 With the 
support of much of the bankruptcy bar, and with a Democratic Congress happy to 
curtail Wall Street influence, the proposed legislation sailed through in 1938.90 
Just as Douglas intended, the Chandler Act radically altered large-scale corporate 
reorganization, removing Wall Street from a practice it had dominated for decades.91 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Each of the history lessons of the two previous parts has been very much in 
evidence in the recent crisis. The first two years of the credit crisis brought a 
variety of efforts to minimize foreclosures, ranging from a quite successful 
foreclosure relief plan here in Philadelphia to the much larger efforts of the Bush 
and Obama administrations.92 But Congress did not enact any significant 
bankruptcy reforms. Moreover, the first legislative proposal that did have 
bankruptcy implications was part of a package of proposed corporate and financial 
reforms.93 Its principal effect on bankruptcy was to take regulatory authority over 
large, systemic financial institutions away from the bankruptcy courts, and give it 
to banking regulators.94 
One could argue that the recent credit crisis was simply the final stage of a 
longer crisis that began with the Enron and WorldCom scandals or even the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble at the beginning of the decade. If we take this longer 
perspective, the story is essentially the same. Unlike with corporate reform, which 
came immediately, there were no bankruptcy changes until 2005, and the vast 
majority of the changes in 2005 had nothing to do with the economic crisis.95 They 
were a project the credit card companies had already been working on for a decade, 
 
89 . Cf. Benjamin Wham, Chapter X of the Chandler Act: A Study in Reconciliation of Conflicting 
Views, 25 VA. L. REV. 389, 392 (1939) (recognizing SEC’s ability to persuade Drafting Committee of 
National Bankruptcy Conference to add certain SEC recommendations to Chandler Bill). 
90 . See SKEEL, supra note 24, at 119 (describing enactment of Chandler Act). 
91 . Id. at 125–27. 
92 . See, e.g., Alan J. Heavens, What a Relief for 1,400 Phila. Foreclosures, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 
1, 2009, at C1 (describing success of Philadelphia plan). 
93 . The original proposal is summarized in Davis Polk & Wardwell Client Memo, Treasury’s 
Proposed Resolution Authority for Systemically Significant Financial Companies (Mar. 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/clientmemos/2009/03.30.09.resolution.authority.pdf. 
The administration subsequently introduced a revised and expanded set of reforms in June 2009. The 
subsequent proposals are described in DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
94 . See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 93, at 76–77 (proposing new resolution authority). 
But see Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 10 (manuscript at 27–29) (critiquing proposals that would shift 
significant regulatory authority from bankruptcy courts to bankruptcy regulators). 
95 . Two exceptions are a provision that requires the U.S. trustee to request the appointment of a 
trustee if there are reasonable grounds for believing the debtor’s management has committed fraud, 11 
U.S.C.             § 1104(e) (2006), and a provision that attempts to limit “pay to stay” bonuses for 
executives, id. § 503(c). These provisions are discussed in David A. Skeel, Jr., Déjà Vu All Over Again 
in Corporate Bankruptcy (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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and which was designed to force more consumer debtors to enter into three- to five-
year repayment plans, rather than receiving an immediate discharge.96 
As of this writing, the verdict is still out on potential bankruptcy reforms, 
with a variety of proposals swirling around. As already noted, the administration 
has proposed that bank regulators be given the authority to take over systemically 
important investment banks and hedge funds, and that the resolution of their 
financial distress be taken away from the bankruptcy courts.97 Other proposals 
would add a special set of new provisions for large nonbank financial institutions 
to the bankruptcy laws, or provide for an interim period during which a large 
nonbank’s obligations would remain while it sought to raise cash or arrange a 
sale.98  
On the consumer side, the mortgage writedown proposal has been hotly 
debated in Washington and seemed on the verge of passing in March 2009, and 
then again in late April 2009.99 This approach is competing with alternative 
approaches, including the three Columbia professors’ proposal calling for 
legislation that might facilitate the restructuring outside of bankruptcy of 
securitized mortgages, and a foreclosure relief package that the Obama 
administration put in place in February.100 
The obvious implications of the recent tumult are that bankruptcy reform may 
still be forthcoming and that the direction of reform is not yet clear. As already 
suggested, my own wish list would include the mortgage writedown provision 
and a commitment to using bankruptcy as the location of choice for resolving the 
financial distress of investment banks and hedge funds.101 This also would be a 
good time to commission a careful study of the role—particularly from a disclosure 
perspective—of hedge funds and equity funds in bankruptcy, much as Congress 
commissioned the vast study overseen by William O. Douglas in the 1930s.102 
 
96 . Cf. Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under 
the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 
221 (2005) (asserting that “[t]he real goal of the creditor lobby was to make bankruptcy of all types more 
difficult for debtors who need it”). 
97 . See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text for a description of the legislative proposal to 
shift regulatory authority from bankruptcy courts to bankruptcy regulators.  
98 . I have developed and promoted these bankruptcy-oriented proposals elsewhere. David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 22–26, on file with author) (advocating special provisions, including stay on derivatives, 
for large nonbank financial institutions); Lee C. Buchheit & David A. Skeel, Jr., Op-Ed., Some 
Bankruptcies Are Worth It, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at A25 (proposing interim period for financial 
institutions in distress). 
99 . See, e.g., U.S. Senate Rejects, supra note 17, at 10 (noting, after April 30, 2009 vote, that 
“mortgage industry has twice succeeded in helping to kill the bankruptcy proposal”). 
100 . See supra notes 9, 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Columbia and Obama 
mortgage modification proposals.  
101 . The latter argument is developed in detail in Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 10.  
102 . See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1632–38 
(2009) (suggesting that Douglas’s study provides template for how to approach study of shadow 
bankruptcy system). 
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Such a study would fit naturally into recent debates about hedge fund regulation 
and oversight of the derivatives markets. 
Perhaps the biggest wild card for the perception of bankruptcy is the Chapter 
11 filings by Chrysler and General Motors.103 Chapter 11’s role in restructuring 
the carmakers could help dispel the myth that bankruptcy is the end of the road for 
a troubled corporation. On the other hand, the administration’s commandeering of 
the bankruptcy process in these cases, and the efforts it took to circumvent the 
ordinary Chapter 11 process,104 could reinforce the suspicion that bankruptcy 
means liquidation absent an extraordinary intervention. Overall, the 
administration’s response is unlikely to significantly alter most Americans’ 
impression of bankruptcy. Moreover, if other firms replicate the government’s 
strategy in future cases, concerns about manipulation in bankruptcy could 
increase.105 
This is a terrible time for millions of Americans. But history suggests that it is 
also a time of great opportunity to make a difference, hopefully for the better, for 
those of us who are involved in the bankruptcy system—whether it be as scholars, 
as lawmakers, as judges, or as lawyers. Perhaps one of us will even prove to be a 
Jay Torrey or a William O. Douglas. We cannot be certain that history will 
conclude that we have contributed to recovery, either in individual lives or in the 
economy more generally. But from a historical perspective, I believe that the 
American bankruptcy laws, more than the insolvency laws of any other country, 
have made it possible to do just that. 
 
103 . The carmaker bankruptcies are described in detail in Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy 5–8 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 09-17; 
Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-22; Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper 
No. 645; Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 09-42, 2009), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1426530.  
104 . See id. at 12–20 (critiquing terms of Chrysler transaction).  
105 . Id. at 27–29. 
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